The Gettier Getaway: a Gettier Example

Here is a Gettier-type (per Gettier's "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?") case I came up with:

A car speeds past you. Directly behind this car follows a speeding police cruiser with its siren on. The speeding cars, one after the other, round a corner and disappear from sight.

You believe on the basis of this incident that the driver of the speeding car is being pursued by the police, perhaps for a criminal act. You are justified in doing so. And in fact, the driver is being pursued by the police for a criminal act.

However, when you saw the driver, he was not trying to escape the police cruiser behind him but was in fact speeding back to his apartment because, after he had robbed a bank earlier that day, he remembered he had left his oven on. The police cruiser behind him was not chasing him but had actually been dispatched to go to the bank the driver had just robbed, in order to pursue the robber (the officer had no idea that that robber was right in front of her). This officer noticed that the car in front of her was speeding, but since she had more important crimes to worry about than traffic violations, she was not pursuing it at that moment.

(i) You believe that the driver is being pursued by the police.

(ii) It is true that the driver is being pursued by the police.

(iii) You are justified in believing the driver is being pursued by the police.

But because what you saw does not actually constitute evidence of his being pursued, you do not know that the driver is being pursued by the police.

This case is different in an important respect from both the first Gettier case and cases like the sheep case (qv. Chisholm) and the clock case (qv. Russell). In those cases, the major premise of the valid inference is a sound implication, but the minor premise is false.

First Gettier Case

(i) If Jones (who has ten coins in pocket) will get the job (p), the person who will get the job has ten coins in pocket (q). [p ⊃ q]

(ii) Jones will get the job. [p]

∴ The person who will get the job has ten coins in pocket. [q]

In fact, Jones will not get the job [~p], though the person who will get the job has ten coins in pocket. [q]

Thus, Smith has made a valid but unsound inference due to the minor premise being false.

Sheep Case

(i) If Roddy sees a sheep in the field (p), there is a sheep in field (q). [p ⊃ q]

(ii) Roddy sees a sheep in the field. [p]

∴ There is a sheep in the field. [q]

In fact, Roddy does not see a sheep in the field (he sees a sheep-like object) [~p], though there is a sheep in the field (that he does not see). [q]

Thus, Roddy has made a valid but unsound inference due to the minor premise being false.

Clock Case

(i) If the clock is working (p), the time it reads is the actual time (q). [p ⊃ q]

(ii) The clock is working. [p]

∴ The time it reads is the actual time. [q]

In fact, the clock is not working [~p], though the time it reads is the actual time (it just so happens). [q]

Thus, a valid but unsound inference has been made due to the minor premise being false.

Gettier Getaway Case

(i) If a speeding car is closely followed by a police car with its siren on (p), the driver of the speeding car is being pursued by the police (q). [p ⊃ q]

(ii) A speeding car is closely followed by a police car with its siren on. [p]

∴ The driver of the speeding car is being pursued by the police. [q]

In fact the speeding car is closely followed by a police car with its siren on [p], and the driver of the speeding car is being pursued by the police. [q]

Since, unlike the other cases, the minor premise in the Gettier getaway case is true, and you have made a valid inference, something else must have gone wrong. It is the major premise that is unsound. We find that [p ⊃ q] in this case is not necessarily true. It is false in some cases^*.

Major premise cases, I think, take us closer to the problem with the “no false lemmas” objection than minor premise cases because with them we see that to be Gettier-proof, the major premise must be necessarily true in all possible worlds, not just in almost all instances. This is a problem because this would seem to set too high a threshold for justification. How could one ever obtain certainty that one’s major premise is necessarily true in all possible worlds? And how many natural inferential bases would be ruled out due to not being necessarily true?

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*The garbage chute case (Sosa) is the most similar in this respect to the Gettier getaway, except that (i) the garbage chute case is inference-based instead of directly perceptual, as the would-be knowledge holder does not see the basement but only infers its state from partial evidence, and (ii) its consequent has to be made false [~q] in order to show that it can go wrong.