A Visitor’s Souvenirs

After the mine’s veins were exhausted,

the town shriveled on the mountainside, skeletal, lonely.

Even the last holdouts had lost hope.

But then a surveyor broke through a passage to a long, thin chamber.

The sheriff grabbed the wild-eyed surveyor’s map,

blocking him from contacting his home office.

Alluring memories bloomed in those townsfolk’s minds

as they followed the sheriff into the mine’s mouth.

Only the two church women refused to follow.

They stood muttering warnings about an ancient visitation.

The townsfolk each saw the visitor in the chamber as an old friend,

rather than as a collector of minds.

Today you’ll find the few elderly inhabitants left from that time

to be free from much thought or speech.

Meta-Philosophical Logic

Consider philosophical tropes as approaches to taking a position on a topic. If T is a topic, such as identity, knowledge, value etc., then one can answer a What (object) question, seeking to define T, a How (manner) question, seeking to explain T's workings, a When-Where-Who (time, place, subject) question, seeking to provide T's origin, or a Why (purpose) question, seeking to define T's value or purpose. Call the What route D for definition, the How route P for process, the When-Where-Who route O for origin, and the Why route V for value.

Then for D, there might be several main lines of answers. (1) one could answer in the negative (n), that there is no such thing as T. (2) one could answer reductively (r) and say that T is only some assemblage or name for other objects. (3) one could assent to the full reality of T and seek to define what differentiates (d) it from other like things. Or (4) one could assent to T's reality but instead seek to define it intrinsically (i) according to necessary and sufficient properties. So, D_n(T), D_r(T), D_d(T), or D_i(T) are possible definition-approach functions on T.

Likewise, it seems one could perform these moves with P, O, and V—with the added change to i for P where functions and mechanisms, with inputs, outputs, and conditions, would also have to be given along with necessary and sufficient properties; with the change to i for O where a particular event description, with a reason for its historical novelty, would have to be given along with necessary and sufficient properties; and with the change to i for V where an account of T's valued effect would have to be given as a product of its necessary and sufficient properties, or those properties themselves would have to be shown to be valued.

So, we have:

1. Conceptual Definition of T: D_n(T), D_r(T), D_d(T), or D_i(T)    

2. Procedural Explanation of T: P_n(T), P_r(T), P_d(T), or P_i*(T)

3. Historical Origin of T: O_n(T), O_r(T), O_d(T), or O_i**(T)

4. Practical Value of T: V_n(T), V_r(T), V_d(T), or V_i***(T)

On a given philosophical topic, these seem to be the available philosophical tropes. Then, within each of the four moves for the four approaches, there are a variety of more nuanced sub-choices that may be available. Broadly, one might begin to map out the entire philosophical discourse generated on any given topic by outputting the available primary theories, objections and other responses to those theories, and defenses against the objections, along with various combinations of compatible theories to form new primary theory-objection-defense sets. One could then look for applications for the resulting maps as they intersect with other fields, if there are any.

However, one might begin to worry about the partiality of the set of T’s. Perhaps the implementation of discourses on T’s provides us true knowledge and benefit with respect to real facets of the world—but is there not something myopic here? What is the set of all T’s? What are T’s on such that they are T’s? What do all philosophical topics share and how are they generated? How do they function as topics such that they are philosophically relevant? How do they attach to the world and become applicable? Could our trope functions range over the whole set T rather than an individual T?

It seems that one could (1) negate the set of all philosophical topics as such by denying that there is ever any such thing as a philosophical topic (or philosophical activity onto such); (2) reduce all philosophical topics as such to some other object or field (or some other type of activity onto such); (3) differentiate all philosophical topics as such from other types of topic; or (4) identify the necessary and sufficient properties of a philosophical topic as such. From this, a total meta-philosophical mapping could be produced. This would provide a formal domain description for philosophy.

Possible schemas for functions D, P, O, and V:

n = ("x(Tx à ~x)

r = (T = φ(x, y))

d = ((~(u ⊆ T) ↔ (T = S)) & (u ⊆ T))

i = (T ↔ φ(x, y))